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Since 1991, the Somali people have existed without a functioning government. Poverty, clan clashes, and western influences have left Somalia lifeless and without direction. In 2006, prominent Somali Muslim men sought to bring order and peace to their people. Their wartime experience in Afghanistan and adoption of a Taliban-style Islam gave them a foundation for bringing order to their fellow Somalis. These men would emerge from the ashes of an Ethiopia encroachment into Somalia, one that would last until December 2008, and form a group calling itself Al-Shabaab or the Mujahidin Youth Movement (MYM). Al-Shabaab's military objectives, organization, spheres of influence, and strategic direction would be influenced by Al-Quida (AQ). This paper which is based on open source information from reporting out of Somalia attempts to identify the vulnerabilities of the MYM and apply the Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) methodology in providing a means to counter the advances of the MYM and limit it's advances throughout the region. 
Organization of Methodology Framework
The framework which I used to organize these vulnerabilities was using the four sources national power -Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic. 4 Second, the next consideration was whether the vulnerability was at the strategic, operational, or tactical level of war. Using this simple design makes it user-friendly so analysts or planners can understand the methodology for application in the future. Too many mythologies for organizing information are either too analytical or technical forcing intelligence or operational planners to disregard them as analytical or planning tools.
M Y M V U L N E R A B I T I E S
The MYM current organization and structure is difficult to know with any certainty.
Estimates on their composition and strength, along with their disposition vary across the community, with estimates ranging from hundreds to thousands. MYM leadership changes and challenges in the use of pseudo-names and aliases makes detailed analysis difficult. Regardless, figure 1 is a composite of all the vulnerabilities identified in my analysis of the MYM.
The remainder of this paper will provide 
Diplomatic-Strategic Vulnerabilities
MYM and the government of President Sharif have both sought the support of the Somali people and neighboring countries. 5 In their struggle to influence the public, the TFG has been endorsed and, subsequently, supported by the United Nations, African Union, and the International Community. This legitimacy will limit the MYM's ability to surface beyond a Somali terrorist organization, and unless the TFG does something viewed as unethical or irresponsibility, they will continue to be supported by international and AU governments, making MYM's attainment of their strategic goals difficult.
In addition, Somali and external religious clerical groups have endorsed the TFG. MYM has not been endorsed by recognized Somali Islamic leaders because they have assassinated leading clerics who disagree within them. The TFG and international community must continue to seek clerical support and endorsement to have a favorable public opinion. 6 It is difficult to determine for how long the TFG will continue to receive aid and public support, especially, if the TFG shows limited results in their ability to provide basic services and protection to the public. These same moderate organizations have criticized the MYM for their aversion to compromise with the TFG, and the MYM's determination to seek the Taliban-form of Sharia (Islamic law).
Diplomatic -Operational Vulnerabilities
These moderate organizations seek peace; which, is in direct contrast to the violent path the MYM has adopted in realization of their goals. As long, the MYM rejects peace and continues to attack AU and TFG forces, these moderate groups will continue to reject MYM claims for leadership of the country. 
Diplomatic-Tactical Vulnerabilities
MYM's unwillingness to accept any form of Sharia other than the Taliban type has resulted in loss of public support from Somali and international groups and leaders. This determination has been recognized and supported by AQ-Central leadership and their affiliates; however, it has also resulted in the TFG and neighboring countries using this in the ongoing public information war.
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In addition, the MYM's organization and dispersed cellular structure has not resulted in a synchronized campaign. Analysis of their attacks on TFG and AU forces has shown that attacks seem to be uncoordinated between MYM units in central and southern Somalia. In addition, MYM's military attacks look to be local, with no, centralized command and control organization, nor, a continued reinforcement of forces after capture of key cities or resources. In fact, holding of key terrain or parts of the country seems to be temporary, with no long term strategy.
Information-Strategic Vulnerabilities
Despite the diplomatic shortcomings, MYM has enjoyed the support of AQ-Central hosted information dissemination websites, which, makes TFG look amateurish. 10 However, over the last few months, MYM-hosted websites have been taken down or disrupted by allies of the TFG.
When this occurs, MYM has had to depend on these AQ-Central websites for dissemination of their tactical victories, magazines, videos, and forum bulletin board announcements. Dependency on someone else's website leaves them vulnerable, and the fact that their last three websites has been disrupted points to their lack of skills in the cyber-warfare arena. 
Information-Tactical Vulnerabilities
In the information operations war being waged on the internet, the MYM has published daily accounts of their tactical victories over the TFG and AU. Despite claiming victories and destruction of TFG and AU resources, there does not seem to be a long-term sustainment or capitulation of these areas. The MYM daily accounts may have a negative impact since they are inferring that MYM would rather be violent then go to the peace table, so an unintended effect may be MYM being labeled as "uncooperative" and always seeking military conflict. In addition, moderate and even hard-line Islamists may tire of this publicity with no tangible results or strategic outcomes. there has been no public or published announcements indicated he controls the organization.
Military-Operational Vulnerabilities
The The continuing struggle between the MYM and the TFG has resulted in the deaths or defection of MYM senior leaders. Dependency on a core of leaders has left MYM vulnerable to losing momentum, and without an effective replacement system, makes them vulnerable to losing military engagements, as well as, the information war with the TFG. Over the last two years, MYM has lost leadership at the region and operational level, and since the MYM does not have a formal military advancement system, in-fighting between field commanders may occur, as key leaders are killed.
Military-Tactical Vulnerabilities
The MYM continues to fight a multi-front, multi-enemy, and multi-level war, and sustaining it may be difficult, especially if the TFG receives additional resources from the United States, the United Nations, and the African Union. The MYM has a host of enemies, including the TFG, the AU, moderate Islamic organizations, and neighboring countries whose forces are growing rapidly. In addition, AU and UN policymakers will be providing TFG with an information 
Economic-Tactical Vulnerabilities
The MYM's base of support permeates from clans that provide both leaders and foot-soldiers.
Clans in Somali have for the most part attempted to remain neutral in the struggle for Somalia, switching sides, as either the MYM or TFG/AU/ASWJ captures or recapture villages and towns.
Clan elders and civic organizations continue to be interested in which group will bring basic services and peace to their people, not one, which will enforce a particular form of Sharia.
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MYM's continued violent attacks and persistence on the Taliban-style of Sharia has alienated clans, forcing others to join the TFG or ASWJ. 19 In the long run, MYM rule by fear has clan leaders willing to comprise and accept MYM regional civil administrations; however, acceptance of the MYM is balanced between surviving today and enduring for tomorrow.
C O N C L U S I O N
The existence of the Mujahedeen Youth Movement depends on many factors, including their ability to recruit soldiers, provide weapons of war to these soldiers, attain support either abroad or at home, and continue to appeal to the Somali population. Their battles have been brilliantly executed, with hundreds of African Union and TFG forces losing their lives or withdrawing from Somali. That being said, the MYM does have its vulnerabilities, and this paper provided an explanation of the Strategic, Operational, and Tactical (SOT) vulnerabilities, organized along the DIME model. A coalition of UN, AU, TFG, and US operational planners can provide resources to these vulnerabilities, which may result in the limitation of MYM influence in Somalia and abroad. This paper was intended to indentify only the vulnerabilities but careful consideration of national and international operational capabilities can lead to the diminishment of the MYM.
